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Abstract
   RFC 5905 [RFC5905] states that Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets
   should be authenticated by appending a 128-bit key to the NTP data,
   and hashing the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag.  This
   document deprecates MD5-based authentication, which is considered to
   be too weak, and recommends the use of AES-CMAC [RFC4493] as a
   replacement.
Status of This Memo
   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice
   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.
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1.  Introduction
   RFC 5905 [RFC5905] states that Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets
   should be authenticated by appending a 128-bit key to the NTP data,
   and hashing the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag.  This
   document deprecates MD5-based authentication, which is considered to
   be too weak, and recommends the use of AES-CMAC [RFC4493] as a
   replacement.
1.1.  Requirements Language
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.  Deprecating MD5
   RFC 5905 [RFC5905] defines how the MD5 digest algorithm in RFC 1321
   [RFC1321] can be used as a message authentication code (MAC) for
   authenticating NTP packets.  However, as discussed in [BCK] and RFC
   6151 [RFC6151], this is not a secure MAC and therefore MUST be
   deprecated.
3.  Replacement Recommendation
   If authentication is implemented, then AES-CMAC as specified in RFC
   4493 [RFC4493] SHOULD be computed over all fields in the NTP header,
   and any extension fields that are present in the NTP packet as
   described in RFC 5905 [RFC5905].  The MAC key for NTP MUST be at
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   least 128 bits long AES-128 key and the resulting MAC tag MUST be at
   least 128 bits long as stated in section 2.4 of RFC 4493 [RFC4493].
   NTP makes this transition possible as it supports algorithm agility
   as described in Section 2.1 of RFC 7696 [RFC7696].
   The hosts who wish to use NTP authentication share a symmetric key
   out-of-band.  So they MUST implement AES-CMAC and share the
   corresponding symmetric key.  A symmetric key is a triplet of ID,
   type (e.g.  MD5, AES-CMAC) and the key itself.  All three have to
   match in order to succesfully authenticate packets between two hosts.
   Old implementations that don’t support AES-CMAC will not accept and
   will not send packets authenticated with such a key.
4.  Motivation
   AES-CMAC is recommended for the following reasons:
   1.  It is an IETF standard that is available in many open source
       implementations.
   2.  It is immune to nonce-reuse vulnerabilities (e.g.  [Joux])
       because it does not use a nonce.
   3.  It has fine performance in terms of latency and throughput.
   4.  It benefits from native hardware support, for instance, Intel’s
       New Instruction set.
5.  Test Vectors
   For test vectors and their outputs refer to Section 4 of RFC 4493
   [RFC4493]
6.  Security Considerations
   Refer to the Appendices A, B and C of NIST document [NIST] and
   Security Considerations Section of RFC 4493 [RFC4493] for discussion
   on security guarantees of AES-CMAC.
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8.  IANA Considerations
   This memo includes no request to IANA.
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